I. Introduction
Previous empirical work on human capital has focused almost exclusively on skills that are either specific to a given firm or completely general. Few studies have explored the importance of skills that are specific to firms in a given industry or sector of the economy, but, in many firms, industryspecific skills may constitute an important component of the typical worker's human capital stock.' For example, all firms in a given manufacturing I would like to thank Bo Honore, Hide Ichimura, Bruce Fallick, Kathryn Shaw, Lori Kletzer, Steve Trejo, William Johnson, Steven Stern, Robert Topel, Matt Kahn, DWe-Il Kim, and especially Robert LaLonde for helpful comments. I also thank workshop participants from the University of Chicago; the University of California, Santa Barbara; the University of Pittsburgh; and Carnegie Mellon University. All errors are mine.
' Kim (1992) and Kletzer (1993) are exceptions. Kim addresses industry-specific skills in an examination of interindustry wage differentials, and Kletzer examines sector-specific skills and sectoral mobility following displacement. In related work, Carrington (1993) examines links between sectoral decline and the consequences of displacement. See Willis (1986) for a review of empirical work on human capital. I argue that the literature on returns to job seniority is too narrowly focused on firm-specific factors. I show that among displaced workers who stay in their predisplacement industry, the profile of postdisplacement wages with respect to predisplacement tenure is quite similar to the wage tenure profile observed in a cross-section of workers. Thus, a complete explanation for the observed relationship between wages and seniority must involve factors that are not truly firm-specific but rather specific to an industry or particular line of work. Existing models of matching, firmspecific investments, and backloaded compensation schemes (that prevent shirking) provide no rationale for a strong correlation between wages on a given job and tenure on a previous job.
In the following two sections, I describe the data and present results that motivate the analyses in the balance of the article. The middle sections of the article address not only the wage innovations that follow displacement but also the decision to switch industries. In the final section, I discuss conclusions and implications for related research.
II. Data
In January of 1990, 1988, 1986, and 1984 , the monthly Current Population Surveys included a supplement that sought additional information from workers who had previously suffered a job displacement. The DWS provides answers to retrospective questions concerning a respondent's employment history in the 5 years prior to the survey date. All persons 20 years and older are asked if they had "lost or left a job because of plant closings, an employer going out of business, a layoff from which [the worker] was not recalled or other similar reasons" in the 5 years preceding the survey date.
For the purposes of the empirical work below, I restrict the sample to workers without predisplacement affiliation in agriculture or construction because displacement is not clearly defined for seasonal workers. Further, I also restrict the sample to workers who are employed full-time on both their predisplacement and postdisplacement jobs. This restriction is necessary because I want to measure wage rate changes that accompany displacement, and weekly earnings is the only wage measure available for both the predisplacement and postdisplacement jobs.
In these surveys, displaced workers do not represent a random sample of the labor force. Previous work by Gibbons and Katz (1991) indicates that firms lay off workers who are, on average, less productive than coworkers who are observationally similar. Therefore, in this article, I restrict my attention to displaced workers who lost their jobs because of establishment closings. As a first approximation, I consider these workers exogenously displaced.3 There is an additional reason to exclude workers on layoff from the sample. Work by Topel (1990) shows that recall bias is a problem in the sample of laid off workers but not in the sample of workers displaced by establishment closings.4
III. A Simple Model of Wage Determination
The empirical strategy of this article is motivated by the following thought experiment. Imagine that a group of workers are exogenously removed from their jobs and then randomly assigned to new firms. Some workers are assigned to new firms in their original industry. Others are assigned to firms in different industries. Further, assume that we observe wages for this group just before they are displaced and just after they begin their new jobs. Finally, assume that wages are determined according to equations (1)-(3) (individual subscripts are suppressed): 3 Nonetheless, these workers do not constitute a random sample of the labor force because the probability of being displaced by an establishment closing may differ across industries. See Carrington and Zaman (1994) for interindustry comparisons of displacement rates.
4 Topel (1990) shows that, in the 1986 and 1984 DWS data sets, there is evidence of recall bias in the layoff sample. This is not true in the plant closing and shift elimination samples. I do not include workers displaced by shift elimination for two reasons. First, firms probably eliminate the least productive shifts. Second, if a firm chooses to eliminate its night shift and increase day shift production, the firm likely offers day shift jobs to the best night shift workers. 
where w1 is the wage on the predisplacement job, w2 is the new wage for stayers, W3 is the new wage for switchers, and X is a vector of worker characteristics. These characteristics are the same before and after displacement. The mean zero error terms s1, s2, and ?3 capture match-specific effects on productivity. All three are independent draws from the same distribution. In this framework, wages rise with experience, industry tenure, and firm tenure because workers acquire general skills, industry-specific skills, and firm-specific skills through on-the-job training. All displaced workers begin their postdisplacement jobs with zero firm tenure and forfeit the returns to seniority in their predisplacement firm. However, workers who switch industries following displacement forfeit both the returns to seniority in their previous firm and the returns to tenure in their previous industry. Thus, among displaced workers who are otherwise observationally similar, we expect switchers to suffer greater wage losses than stayers following displacement, and we expect the switcher-stayer differential in losses to increase with predisplacement industry tenure.
Among workers with the same seniority prior to displacement, the expected wage loss for a given switcher exceeds the expected wage loss for stayers by an amount proportional to the switcher's industry tenure. Therefore, with data from the experiment described above, one could estimate 0, the return to industry tenure, using a standard difference in differences approach.5
Unfortunately, I do not have data from an experiment. Further, even if one is willing to treat the wage and employment changes that follow establishment closings as outcomes of natural experiments, the data provided by the DWS do not accommodate a straightforward difference in differences analysis. To begin, the DWS does not provide data on industry tenure. Further, because the surveys are retrospective, the intervals between wage observations may be as great as 5 years, and productive worker characteristics may change during these intervals. Finally, it is impossible to fully control for these changes in worker characteristics because the surveys do Industry-Specific Human Capital 657 not provide both predisplacement and postdisplacement observations on all worker characteristics.6
In light of these data limitations, I adopt the following approach. I regress the changes in log wages that accompany displacement on potential predisplacement experience, predisplacement job tenure, years since displacement, weeks unemployed following displacement, controls for occupational change, dummies for year of displacement, and several demographic characteristics. Further, I run these quasi-first-difference regressions separately for both male and female stayers and switchers.7
These regressions do not share the exact structure of the heuristic model outlined in equations (1)-(3), but the model does suggest several likely results. The difference between switchers and stayers is that switchers forfeit compensation for their industry-specific skills. Therefore, following displacement, the wage cost of switching industries should vary positively with predisplacement industry tenure. In the absence of direct controls for industry tenure, we expect to observe positive correlations between the wage cost of switching industries and predisplacement measures of both experience and firm tenure.8
The anticipated results are borne out in table 1. Among displaced men who switch industries, wage losses increase with experience and tenure at roughly twice the rates observed among stayers. Consider two workers. One is displaced after working 10 years for the same employer. The other is displaced during the first year of his career. If both are switchers, the former's expected loss in log wages is more than .27 greater than the loss 6 Given the structure of the DWS, I cannot tell how long a worker has been on his postdisplacement job, exactly how much he worked between the date of displacement and the interview date, or how many jobs he held following displacement. In the analyses below, I use years since displacement and weeks unemployed following displacement as controls for the composition of each worker's labor market experience following displacement. Further, the surveys do not provide predisplacement observations on demographic variables like education and marital status. Therefore, I use postdisplacement values as proxies for predisplacement demographic characteristics.
'All wages are measured in 1990 dollars. With the exception of a few service industries, I define industries at the two-digit levels. See appendix table A2 for a list of the industries.
8 Throughout most of the article, I discuss industry-specific skills as acquired attributes. This facilitates exposition but is not central to the analysis. My results imply an important link between wages and industry tenure, but they do not necessarily imply that workers invest in industry-specific skills. Variants of Jovanovic s (1979a) matching model could easily generate a correlation between wages and industry tenure. In such models, workers would search across industries, and wages would be determined by idiosyncratic matches between worker attributes and the tasks performed in a given industry. expected by the latter. If both are stayers, the corresponding differential is less than .13.9
The results are not so dramatic for women. Losses are much more strongly correlated with tenure among displaced women who switch industries than among those who find new jobs in their original industry, but potential predisplacement experience is uncorrelated with wage losses for both switchers and stayers. I conjecture that the results for men and women differ in large part because potential experience is a noisier measure of total work experience for women, and thus, more weakly correlated with industry tenure. In the balance of the article, I focus on results for the male sample only.10
The results in table 1 suggest that, among experienced workers, a significant component of wages may reflect compensation for industry-specific skills. However, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients may be misleading because these regressions do not address an obvious selection bias problem. Among displaced workers with a given set of predisplacement characteristics, those who possess comparatively few industry-specific skills are more likely to switch industries. Therefore, the relationship between industry tenure and industry-specific compensation in a sample of switchers may be quite different than the relationship observed in the labor force as a whole."
In the following sections, I describe versions of the above regressions that include explicit controls for selection bias. Further, I present alternative specifications that address competing explanations for the results in table 1. 9 The standard errors on these expected losses are .035 and .040, respectively. Although stayers should retain compensation for both their general and industryspecific skills, wage changes are negatively correlated with predisplacement experience among stayers. I offer two possible explanations for this result. First, given the structure of the DWS, postdisplacement wage growth affects the wage change observations, and human capital theory suggests that younger workers may experience faster wage growth. Further, Jovanovic (1979b) and other models that include outside offers demonstrate that, holding tenure constant, the expected value of job matches increases with market experience. 10 Below, I present results that include controls for selection bias and controls for industry wage rents. I have conducted similar analyses for women. The results follow the pattern observed in table 1. Among women, job tenure but not potential experience appears to be correlated with industry-specific compensation.
" Assume that the data permitted a direct regression of log wage changes on predisplacement industry tenure using the sample of switchers. The sign of the bias on the slope coefficient would be given by the covariance between industry tenure and the error term, conditional on a voluntary switch. The discussion above implies that this covariance would be positive. If industry-specific skills are important, the costs of switching rise with industry tenure. Thus, conditional on a voluntary switch, the expected value of the error term in the switcher's equation should be an increasing function of predisplacement tenure. 
where sit is the latent value of switching industries for displaced worker i. If Zi does not contain at least one element that is excluded from the wage regressions, the identification of the model hinges completely on functional form assumptions. Therefore, satisfactory identification requires data on factors that affect the value of switching industries but do not directly affect wages.
My goal is to construct variables that, given a worker's characteristics, are unrelated to wage offers either prior to or following displacement but are still related to switching behavior through the costs of search. In this effort, I employ information from the Employment and Earnings Reports of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The reports provide yearly levels of employment for each industry. From these data, I construct, for each worker, both the total number of jobs and the rate of job growth in the worker's predisplacement industry during the year the worker is displaced."2 I hypothesize that search costs associated with finding a job in one's predisplacement industry decrease with the number of jobs and the rate of job growth in that industry. Total employment in an industry should be inversely related to the cost of applying for a job in that industry. Workers displaced from retail trade can easily apply for new jobs in other retail stores, but workers displaced from small industries may have to relocate in order to apply for jobs in their original industry. Further, given the level of employment in an industry, the costs of finding a job opening should fall with the rate of job growth in the industry.
Is it reasonable to assume that total industry employment and industry employment growth are uncorrelated with wage offers? I see no direct link between wage offers and the level of industry employment, but the rate of employment growth in an industry may be correlated with product demand shifts or shocks to technology that affect the marginal product of labor in that industry.'3 Therefore, in the analyses below, I include both industry employment levels and industry employment growth rates as determinants of the latent value of switching industries, but I exclude only the employment levels from the wage change equations.4 Table 2 presents results from the probit analysis of industry switching. Both industry employment levels and employment growth have the expected impact on the probability of industry switching. Evaluate Zi at the sample means of worker characteristics. The predicted probability of switching industries is approximately 64%. Given this base, a 1 SD increase in predisplacement industry employment translates into an approximately 7% decrease in predicted industry switching. A corresponding increase in the employment growth rate for the predisplacement industry yields a reduction of roughly 5%. '15 Using the estimated coefficients from the probit model, I estimate selection corrected regressions of changes in log wages on worker characteristics for displaced men."6 Columns 1 and 2 of table 3 contain specifications that are analogous to those in table 1. Here, the estimated coefficients on predisplacement tenure and experience reveal an even sharper contrast between stayers and switchers. An additional 10 years of experience with the same employer implies an increase in log wage losses of .31 for switchers but only .1 for stayers.'7 Therefore, the corrected results suggest that the ordinary least squares (OLS) results in table 1 may understate the effects of both experience and tenure on the wage cost of switching industries.
I offer these corrected results as additional support for the hypothesis that workers receive compensation for industry-specific skills, but others 13 I do not address the fact that all search costs may influence reservation wages and thus may influence distributions of accepted wages. Here, I implicitly assume that workers know the wage they would receive in their predisplacement industry and in other industries. Therefore, workers stay in their original industry whenever the wage gains associated with staying exceed the additional costs associated with locating a new job in that particular industry.
14 Number of kids is also included in the probit equation but excluded from the wage change equations. Family size may affect mobility costs, but, conditional on the other observed worker characteristics, family size should not influence wage offers. 15 The results also show that the probability of switching declines with predisplacement tenure. Topel (1990) reports similar results. 16 In this work, I address only the decision to switch industries. I do not model selection into reemployment. In unreported analyses, I explore this issue by further restricting the sample to workers who were displaced at least 1 year before the survey date. Although this restriction eliminates approximately 17% of the sample, the estimated tenure and experience effects are almost identical to those reported in table 3. See Fallick (1993) for an analysis of reemployment decisions following displacement. may argue that the results simply demonstrate that workers in some industries earn rents. It is well known that wages differ substantially across industries for observationally similar workers.18 If industry wage premiums represent labor market rents, and jobs are rationed in high-wage industries, two results might be expected. First, because rents impede mobility, average industry tenure may be higher for workers in high-wage industries."9 Second, wage losses associated with displacement should be particularly large among workers who leave high-wage industries. Thus, the presence of labor market rents in high-wage industries may contribute to the apparent correlation between industry tenure and the wage cost of switching industries.
I investigate this issue by estimating alternative specifications of both the selection equation and the wage change equations that include controls for the industry wage premiums and union coverage rates associated with each worker's predisplacement job. The industry wage premiums come from a standard cross-section wage regression. The regression does not include controls for union status. Therefore, the wage premiums capture industry level rents generated by union activity as well as any rents associated with the payment of efficiency wages.20 Because the surveys do not provide individual union status on predisplacement jobs, I use the union coverage rate in a worker's three-digit industry as a control for individual union status prior to displacement.21 Results from the alternative model are displayed in columns 3 and 4 of table 3.22 18 See Krueger and Summers (1988) and Katz and Summers (1989) . Both present numerous empirical results concerning the pattern of interindustry wage differentials, and both conclude that workers in high-wage industries earn substantial rents. 19 Krueger and Summers (1988) provide evidence that, among observationally similar workers, average tenure is higher in high-wage industries. 20 Appendix table A2 presents the industry wage premiums and details their construction. 21 The data come from Curme, Hirsch, and MacPherson (1990). Because the data do not provide coverage rates for all years covered by the DWS, I define one coverage rate for each industry as the average rate over the period 1983-86. To further investigate the importance of predisplacement union status, I reestimated the specifications in table 3 using a sample of workers who were likely not in union jobs prior to displacement. Table A5 details the results and the sample selection rules. The losses for switchers are smaller in this "nonunion" sample, but the estimated experience and tenure profiles are quite similar to those in table 3. 22 The alternative model included controls for coverage rates and industry wage premiums in both the selection equation and the wage change regressions. The additional controls increase the explanatory power of the probit model. Workers displaced from high-wage industries are more reluctant to switch industries than similar workers displaced from low-wage industries. Nonetheless, the probit results from the alternative specification are quite similar to the baseline results in table 2.
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The additional controls do weaken the correlations between log wage losses for switchers and predisplacement measures of both experience and tenure, but the results still indicate important profile differences between switchers and stayers. Among switchers, losses in log wages rise roughly twice as fast with both predisplacement experience and tenure. The wage cost of switching industries is clearly greatest among senior workers with considerable labor market experience. For displaced males, the first 10 years of work experience with a given employer im- plies an addition to log wage losses of .21 for switchers but less than .11 for stayers.23
The results from both specifications suggest that workers receive industry-specific compensation and that levels of industry-specific compensation are correlated with industry tenure. If the controls, in columns 3 and 4, for industry wage premiums and union coverage rates are actually controls for rents, then, on average, a portion of industry-specific compensation reflects rents and not compensation for industry-specific skills. However, there is considerable debate about whether or not workers in 666 Neal high-wage industries and/or unions actually earn rents. Several studies document the sorting of workers on ability across industries and argue that industry wage premiums, in part, reflect differences across industries in unobserved dimensions of worker skill.24 Further, some researchers contend that, within a given industry, unmeasured differences in worker quality account for a portion of the wage gap between union and nonunion workers. 25 The results in table 3 show that displaced workers maintain their predisplacement industry wage premiums if they find new jobs in their predisplacement industry. However, displaced workers who leave high-wage industries lose over half of their predisplacement premiums. Are these switchers forfeiting industry-specific rents, compensation for industryspecific skills, or both? The existing literature on interindustry wage differentials does not provide a clear answer to this question.
V. Returns to Predisplacement Job Tenure
The results in the previous section have important implications for existing research on the returns to job seniority. Most explanations for the observed correlation between wages and seniority stress firm-specific factors. Matching models and models of investment in firm-specific human capital focus on the firm-specific aspects of worker productivity.26 Further, models that address shirking problems offer backloaded compensation schemes as solutions to particular agency problems between a firm and its workers.27 However, the results in table 3 indicate that the observed correlation between job tenure and wages is driven in part by industry-specific factors.
To further highlight the link between industry-specific compensation and the returns to job seniority, I present three additional regressions. The first is a standard cross-section wage regression of log wages on tenure and other worker characteristics using data from the predisplacement jobs. The second and third are regressions of log postdisplacement wages on predisplacement tenure and other worker characteristics. I estimate one for switchers and the other for stayers, again using Heckman's method to control for selection bias. Table 4 Mean of dependent variable 6.14 5.96 6.14 N 2,641 1 is a sample selection problem. By definition, every worker in the sample lost his predisplacement job before the end of his career. Shared investments in firm-specific training and implicit contracts that backload compensation may be most common in jobs where the probability of displacement is low.
VI. Conclusions and Implications for Future Research
The results presented here show that the wage cost of switching industries following displacement is strongly correlated with predisplacement measures of both work experience and tenure. Further, displaced workers who find new jobs in their predisplacement industry earn significantly greater returns to both their predisplacement experience and tenure than observationally similar workers who switch industries following displacement. I interpret these results as evidence that workers receive compensation for some skills that are neither completely general nor firm-specific but rather specific to a set of firms that produce similar products and services.
Further, it appears that the literature on returns to seniority focuses too narrowly on firm-specific factors. Displaced workers who find new jobs in their predisplacement industries earn substantial returns to their predisplacement tenure. In fact, the returns approximate standard cross-section estimates of the returns to current job tenure. This finding suggests that firm-specific factors may contribute little to the observed slope of wage tenure profiles.
Previous work on the costs of displacement clearly establishes that senior, experienced workers suffer larger wage losses following displacement than workers displaced early in their careers. Further, the literature also shows that switchers suffer greater wage losses than stayers.32 The results presented here highlight an interaction between these previously established results. The switcher-stayer differential in wage losses is not a constant. Like the overall level of losses, this differential increases with predisplacement experience and tenure. Thus, the private wage costs of displacement may be greatest for experienced workers who are displaced during a large decline in total industry employment. These workers may find it costly to obtain new jobs in their predisplacement industry, and they will suffer large wage losses if they switch industries.33
In closing, I must acknowledge the possibility that the results outlined above reflect the importance of skills that are not truly specific to given Neal industries, but rather specific to a set of jobs that are associated with the intersection of certain occupations and industries. Helwege (1992) NOTE.-The estimated wage premiums come from a cross-sectional regression that includes dummies for industry affiliation. The dependent variable is log current weekly earnings. Other regressors include a constant, sex, race, marital status, experience, and experience2, years of education, three region dummies, nine occupation dummies, and interaction terms between sex and marriage, sex and experience, and sex and experience2. The data come from full-time workers in the January Current Population Surveys for 1990, 1988, 1986, and 1984. This table replicates the analyses in table  3 . However, workers displaced from blue-collar jobs in three-digit industries with union coverage rates over one-third are eliminated from the sample. This is an attempt to estimate the models on a sample of "nonunion" workers. It is not possible to perform such analyses directly because the DWS does not provide union status prior to displacement. See table 3 for further details. The occupation dummies do not control for predisplacement occupation. Rather, they measure net changes in occupational affiliation. For example, a person leaving a management job and entering a sales position would be coded as follows: management = -1; sales = 1; other occupations = 0. A person who does not change occupations receives zeros for all categories. Laborer is the omitted occupation.
